This paper extends the Downsian-Hotelling model of electoral competition to allow for unobserved qualitative differences between candidates. I show that these underlying qualitative differences generate pure strategy Nash equilibria, even if policies are defined in a multidimensional space, and explain platform divergence from the median. Moreover, the extension gives content to a second (well-known) role elections play apart from bridging conflict: to reveal information about candidates.
Introduction
Political competition takes place over many issues at a time. A useful starting point to model them is to divide them along policy and qualitative dimensions. In rough terms, the former are variables over which there is disagreement in society, modelled with voters who have different ideal points in an Euclidean space. In contrast, the latter are variables which voters agree upon, with a common order across voters of what is "better" and "worse". In political science these are known as "valence" issues, a term coined by Stokes (1963) .
Most papers have assumed both sets of variables are observable and have modelled one set at a time, taking the other as fixed or set by some exogenous process to the candidates. For example, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) , Aragonés and Palfrey (2002) , and Groseclose (2001) model candidates' policy choice given their qualitative differences. Testa (2005) , instead, takes as given the policies candidates can implement, as in the citizen-candidate model of Besley and Coate (1997) , and analyzes candidates' quality choice. In principle, there is no reason why candidates could not, potentially, pick both. So far, there has been little gained by modelling this choice. Meirowitz (2005) and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2005) consider the choice of policy and effort (mapped into quality), but arrive at problematic conclusions. Meirowitz (2005) considers a contest (ceteris paribus effort increases the probability of winning) and finds that whether the "stronger" candidate diverges from the median or not depends on the timing of choice; i.e. the choice of policy or effort. Instead, Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2005) consider an all-pay auction (ceteris paribus greater effort implies winning) and find that if policy is selected first, equilibria might not exist even with a unidimensional policy space.
In this paper I extend the classic Downsian model of one-dimensional political competition. Candidates are observationally identical (as in Downs), but the policies they pick cover many dimensions. This extension is not immediate, as shown in the work of Plott (1967) , McKelvey (1976) and others. I show that the presence of an unobserved qualitative characteristic of candidates is enough to generate equilibria. The model is based on the following insight: candidates who are identical ex-ante can compete offering multidimensional policies if elections perform an informational role: they disseminate information about candidates' qualities over and above bridging conflict.
The intuition that lies behind the multidimensional problem raised in Plott (1967) , McKelvey (1976) and other work is that, if there are no differences between candidates, there is always a policy one candidate can offer that undercuts the other candidate (in the sense of gaining support from a majority of the population), unless a strong symmetry condition is imposed on the voting population, as shown in Plott (1967) . This problem has motivated a (large) literature that has modified the standard Downsian model. A starting point is either to return to a one-dimensional setup, as considered in the structure induced equilibrium defined in Shepsle (1979) or, as in Gans and Smart (1996) and Rothstein (1990) , by finding assumptions that ensure that the one dimensional model is a reduced form of the multidimensional case. Alternatively, one can assume that a candidate cannot undercut another because only offering their preferred point is credible, as in Besley and Coate (1997) , or because there might be no gain in undercutting, as in the incomplete preference setup in Roemer (2001) . None of these avenues are explored in this paper, as it is the underlying qualitative characteristic of candidates that allows for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria.
There are many previous models of elections where revealing qualitative information about candidates is important for the election. Ferejohn (1986) is one of the first analyses of this question in a repeated setup. However, his model is not based on signaling from candidates, but on their evaluation by voters (i.e. moral hazard). Rogoff (1990) , instead, considers a model with adverse selection, whilst Banks and Sundaram (1993) analyze a model with both. Prat (2002) is a signaling model, but it is not done by candidates but through an indirect mechanism, the campaign contributions of lobbies. In the model in this paper, qualitative information about candidates is revelant not only for the properties of equilibria, but to establish their existence.
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) have considered the case when candidates compete in multidimensional space and the qualitative difference is observed, but this implies candidates are not identical. Instead, when the qualitative characteristic is unobserved, for it to be known to voters, candidates must be able to signal it. I construct a repeated election game, where parties can constrain candidates' incentives to misreport their true quality. Importantly, I show that, in a fully revealing equilibrium, the punishment device voters exert on candidates is not based on future costly actions for voters. To "punish" a candidate it is enough that the support of policies through which candidates signal who is stronger changes in case there is a deviation. That is, the support of voters' beliefs is not constant in case a candidate deviates from the fully revealing path and signals she is strong when she is not. This ensures an advantage to the non-deviating candidate in the future. The immediate implication is that the resulting equilibrium does not depend on the discount factor of voters, as it is their beliefs, which are not derived from optimizing behavior, which are essential to construct the fully revealing equilibrium.
An important question in political science is whether a stronger candidate will implement more or less moderate positions with respect to the median than a weaker candidate. For example, contrary to Fiorina's (1973) marginality hypothesis, Groseclose (2001) has found that stronger candidates will locate at more centrist policies. Instead, for a particular timing of decisions, Meirowitz (2005) arrives at the opposite result. In this paper I show that the prediction of both is not contradictory for this model. I show that the set of policies a candidate can implement is convex and centered at the median. Thus, the greater the qualitative advantage, the further she can position herself, yet she need not implement an extremist policy. The stronger candidate can always implement moderate positions and win. The reason is that, as in Downs, candidates have no preferences for policy: it is just an instrument for them to win. Thus, they are indifferent between any policy that allows them to win.
The paper compares the set of equilibria to the "yolk", a set that has proven useful in the Social Choice literature. The "yolk" is defined in McKelvey (1986) as the set centered at the generalized median that measures the degree of symmetry of voter ideal points relative to Plott (1967)'s conditions for an equilibrium.
The Spatial Model
In the following model the word 'candidate' is used with the understanding that it refers to a candidate / political party, i.e. an infinitely-lived agent.
Preferences
There is an infinitely-repeated election with two candidates/parties D and R. In each period, a voter gets quadratic utility from the candidate elected based on two characteristics of the winner: the policy promised to implement in that period if elected, x t , and a variable related to the relative quality of this candidate, q jt ∈ <:
where i is the voter's ideal point, which is constant across time. Ideal points and policies are defined in a compact and convex subset in Euclidean space: x, i ∈ X ⊂ < n and k·k 2 represents the square of the Euclidean distance, i.e.
The distribution of ideal points on X is represented by F . The binary variable φ (·) is defined as:
with Q > 0 and Q > Q for Q defined below. A voter's action is represented by a vote for candidate R or D, as I will only consider pure strategies: for voter
The indifference rule I assume is the following: if a voter is indifferent between two candidates he votes for the 3 candidate he believes is stronger. Thus, the strategy of a voter is a mapping
, where (X × X) refers to the space of proposals both candidates can offer and H refers to the set of possible histories h t of who won, who lost, and with which proposals. As in this model (as in others) the absolute quality of candidates is not revelant but their relative quality, without loss of generality we focus on the difference q Rt − q Dt defined by the distribution G. G is assumed symmetric
, with independent realizations across time and no mass point at 0 (i.e. at q R = q D ).
Majority rule is used to elect candidates. They differ from voters in that they do not care for the policy implemented or the quality of the winner. They just care for winning and, as a result, can commit to implement any policy in X prior to the election, as it has no cost for them. Their utility is
where b represents the benefit of winning and p t the probability of being elected in the current election. Thus, p Rt = 1 − p Dt is the probability with which candidate R wins.
Information
In each period t an election is held. In that period, nature first picks a realization of the difference in qualities q Rt − q Dt . Candidates observe the realization and, when they are uninformed, voters do not. Each candidate then offers the platform he will implement if elected. Third, voters try to infer the realization of relative quality from the actions candidates take, then they vote, and the winner is elected by majority rule implementing the policy he promised. Finally, payoffs are realized as voters observe the difference in qualities between candidates.
Notion of Equilibrium
With perfect information I consider pure strategy Nash equilibria but rule out those with weakly dominated strategies. With imperfect information I consider pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria and also rule out those with weakly dominated strategies. 
Existence (Q > Q)
Call M the set of median hyperplanes in X, given voters' ideal points i 1 . The distance between a point x and a median hyperplane m is min xm∈m kx − x m k. As X is compact, it follows that the maximum distance between a point x and any median hyperplane, max
We now define the set W (Q), which is nothing but the set of points in X such that, if they are proposed by the stronger candidate, she is preferred by a majority to the other candidate.
That is, the bundle consisting of a policy in W (Q) and offered by the stronger candidate is majority-preferred to any policy offered by the other candidate. This is the basis for the following version of a proposition in Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) .
Existence of an equilibrium follows as a corollary to this proposition.
Corollary A Nash equilibrium exists if and only if
Note that the term on the right hand side of the inequality is nothing but the radius of the Generalized Median Set defined in McKelvey (1986) . This is 1 For any x ∈ X and any a ∈ < the hyperplane generated by x and a is the set h (x,a) = {z ∈ X|z · x =a}. Given a set of voter ideal points {i ∈ X} ∀i , for some y ∈ X and b ∈ <, a median hyperplane m (y,b) divides the space X into two half-spaces with equal number of ideal points (the sets {z ∈ X|z · y >b} and {z ∈ X|z · y <b}, respectively). 5 the smallest closed ball that intersects all median hyperplanes, or the distance of how far is the voting distribution from satisfying Plott's (1967) conditions for a Nash equilibrium. When Plott's (1967) conditions are satisfied, an equilibrium exists, even if there are no qualitative differences between candidates. An important distinction to bear in mind for the repeated game is whether the set W (Q) has positive measure or is a single point. This is determined by whether Q is strictly greater than Q or not. 1986) and is the center of the Generalized Median Set. An important property of W (Q) is that it is convex.
Characterization
Convexity is a result of the construction of the set: its boundaries are defined by hyperplanes (parallel to the median hyerplanes).
For those familiar with the one-dimensional Downsian model the set of policies the stronger candidate can implement is immediate: the stronger she is relative to the other candidate, the further she can diverge from the median.The intuition behind the policies when the space is multidimensional is analogous. Existence literally assures that "she is strong enough relative to the other candidate that if she offers the median, she wins". If the stronger candidate happens to be stronger than the minimum to establish existence, then she can also implement policies that diverge from the median.
Hence, the introduction of valence issues, of a qualitative variable in the Downsian model, can lead to Fiorina's (1973) marginality hypothesis -stronger candidates will locate at less centrist policies. However, it need not: a stronger candidate can implement any policy that is not further away from the median than her relative advantage allows her to. Thus, a very strong candidate can locate far away from the median, but need not.
Multiplicity of equilibria
In the analysis above, when the set W (Q) has positive measure (i.e. if Q > Q) there are multiple equilibria. This is a direct consequence of having candidates who see policy as an instrument and not an end in itself. If each candidate were to have a preference for policy (an ideal point) existence of an equilibrium still relies on W (Q) being non-empty. However, there would be no multiplicity of equilibria with respect to the policy the winner implements. In particular, the equilibrium policy of the "stronger" candidate would be the closest point to her ideal point bounded by her qualitative advantage. That is, if the ideal point of the "stronger" candidate belonged to W (Q), she would win implementing her 6 preferred policy and the policy of the loser would remain undefined. Instead, if her ideal point did not belong to W (Q), then a Nash equilibrium would need to specify two policies: the policy the stronger candidate offers and implements and the policy the weaker candidate offers. The former is the policy in W (Q) closest to the "stronger" candidate's ideal point. The latter is a policy such that if the "stronger" candidate were to move epsilon closer to her ideal point (and exit W (Q)), she would lose against the "weaker" candidate's policy. In general, it is difficult to characterize this latter case. However, for the one dimensional example in figure 1 , the median is such a policy: if the "stronger" candidate promises a policy further away from the median than her qualitative advantage, the "weaker" candidate wins offering the median 2 .
Pareto-Optimality
The set of Pareto optimal policies (PO) of the Downsian model with quadratic preferences is well-known: it is the convex hull of ideal points.
•
The median Lemma 2
is the set of Pareto optima (PO). 
W(Q') ⊂ W(Q) (with Q' < Q)

Figure 2
One-stage game with perfect information: a multidimensional example.
i 2
Given that the set of Pareto optima and the set of winning policies are both convex and contain the generalized median point, then they always have a common interesection. However, the latter is increasing in Q, in the sense that if
Instead, the set of Pareto optima is not parameterized by Q. It follows that a candidate with a large qualitative advantage can, potentially, implement policies that are not Pareto optima: she offers a policy preferred by a majority to any policy offered by the other candidate, but she could offer another policy preferred by this same majority. 
Relation to Social Choice
It is interesting to compare the above characterization of an equilibrium with the "yolk", the Generalized Median Set defined in McKelvey (1986) . This definition is useful to construct bounds on the set of outcomes that result when aggregating individual preferences into social decisions. In Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) the authors state that "...unless candidate A's [the stronger candidate's] advantage on the valence issue is large, then candidate A's policy position must be near the yolk." Here we provide a direct comparison of the equilibrium set with respect to the yolk and illustrate it in figure 3 with the example of voter ideal points presented in figure 2 . For any c ∈ X and r ∈ < + let β (c,r) = {x ∈ X| kc − xk 6 r} be the closed ball with center at c and radius r. Denote β m the set of all such balls that intersect every median hyperplane m: β m = {β (c,r) |∀m ∈ M, m ∩ β (c,r) 6 = ∅}.
The following is defined in McKelvey (1986).
Definition The yolk is the ball in β m with minimum radius. 
W(Q') ⊂ W(Q) (with Q' < Q)
The generalized median Note that, as is the case with the set of Pareto optima, the yolk is not parameterized by Q. Instead, as mentioned above, the set of winning policies W (Q) is increasing in Q, in the sense defined above. It follows that the yolk could contain W (Q), be contained in W (Q) or satisfy none of these binary relations, depending on whether Q is "small" or "large". That is, if Q = Q then W (Q) ⊆ yolk, instead if Q ≫ Q then yolk ⊂ W (Q). There are intermediate cases where none of the two relations is satisfied (see figure 3) .
The infinitely-repeated game Existence
Existence of an equilibrium in the infinite repetition of a one-stage game that has an equilibrium is immediate.
Imperfect Information
Assume Q > Q and note that if the qualitative dimension of a candidate is unobserved, voters can only gather information about candidates' qualities through their actions.
The one period election
For a candidate to be able to distinguish herself, there must exist incentives in the game for her to perform some observable action that the other candidate cannot imitate. This is not possible in the one period game, as candidates's utilities cannot be conditioned on a future payoff. It follows that there exist no Bayesian equilibria where candidates' information is revealed.
Proposition 3 There exist no equilibria where candidates' qualitative variable is revealed.
However, there exist Bayesian equilibria where no information is revealed (i.e. pooling equilibria). Let ϕ : X × X → [0, 1] be the (assumed common) belief function of voters that the stronger candidate is R. That is, it is the probability voters believe candidate R is stronger after observing candidates' offers (x D , x R ). Consider the following set of strategies and beliefs. The equilibrium strategies of candidates state that both offer the same point 
The infinitely-repeated game
When the above game is repeated, there is a way for voters to condition candidates' payoffs on their actions, if they care sufficiently for the future. Moreover, the punishment device need not be based on voters' actions, but on voters beliefs of who is the stronger candidate in the future, in case there is a present deviation. That is, as in all repeated games, an equilibrium path relies on finding a suitable out-of-equilibrium path, a "punishment", that produces the right incentives to avoid deviations from the equilibrium path. In the following equilibrium, however, the construction of such an out-of-equilibrium path is not based on voters enforcing some costly set of actions on candidates with direct consequences on their payoffs. Thus, the punishment device voters exert on candidates is not based on some future costly action for themselves. To "punish" a candidate it is enough to change the support of voters' belief of who is the stronger candidate, given the policies candidates offer in the future to signal their strength. This ensures an advantage to a given candidate (the non-deviator) in case voters cannot update their prior belief at a future point in time. Thus, the periods in which the deviator is being "punished" she is not elected, not because voters punish her by not electing her, but because, given that they cannot update their prior, the policy of the non-deviator is preferred by a majority. Figure 4 shows the support of voters' beliefs in case there is no deviation and figure 5 in case there is one. Note that, in both figures, the supports are such that if both candidates signal they are the strong candidate and, thus, voters cannot update their prior belief, one of the two candidates wins with probability one. Our proof is constructive and is based on the following example of an equilibrium. The parameter δ, the lower bound the discount factor has to satisfy. N * is the number of periods a candidate is put at a disadvantage. It need not be bounded (i.e. it can be infinite), but it can be. The restrictions they need to satisfy are found in the appendix. Let ϕ it : (X × X) × H → [0, 1] be the belief function of a voter that the stronger candidate is R. Assume it is equal across voters ϕ it = ϕ t . That is, it is the probability voters believe candidate R is stronger after observing candidates' offers (x Dt , x Rt ), given a history h t . Define, 12 for convenience, E [U(x jt ; i,ϕ *
Policies assigned to deviator to signal relative strength. Policies assigned to non-deviator to signal relative strength.
• i 1
Indifference curve in policy space of voter 1. Indifference curve in policy space of voter 2. 
otherwise.
(iii) Beliefs of voters:
Note that in this example of a revealing equilibrium no information is revealed in the periods after a deviation (when there is "punishment").
Characterization
In the infinite repetition of this game we do not attempt to provide a full characterization of the set of equilibria. However, the above example of a class of equilibria is general enough to implement all policies that are equilibria in the perfect information game where the stronger candidate is elected with probability one, as candidates' information about their relative strength is revealed to voters.
Proposition 5 If Q > Q and δ > δ then all x ∈W (Q) are implementable.
Proposition 5 states: if the set of Nash equilibria in the one-stage game with perfect information has positive measure (with respect to the policy space), then all equilibria implementable in such game are implementable in the infinitelyrepeated game with imperfect information, for a sufficiently high discount factor.
